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Whether the noneist really can avoid
postulating different kinds of being-in
particular, whether he can explain to
those of us who think that the correct
answer to the question ‘What exists?’
is ‘Everything’ just how and why our
conception of what objects our bound
individual variables range over is
unduly narrow-is one of the many
difcult and delicate questions which I
cannot pursue here. (Hale 2007:95fn.2)
In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism (as developed
in both Routley 1980 and Priest 2016) and Crane’s (2013) psychological reductionism are
different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed
to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment,
this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim some-
thing more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally
makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately
distinguished from a Quinean form of allism in terms of the different scope of the overall
ontological domain on which the only existential quantifier that there is ranges. This may
orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances
notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by
means of first-order related notions.
1 Noneist ontological commitment to nonexistents
In (2013), Tim Crane has reprised and developed some theses that he had originally de-
fended in (2001). According to Crane, one can truly speak and think, both singularly
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and generically, of nonexistent intentional objects, even though, unlike existent intentional
objects, those items are not entities. However, existence is the main metaphysically un-
substantive difference between entities and such objects. In other words, nonexistent in-
tentionalia do not constitute a sui generis metaphysical kind: they are not exotica, in
Sainsbury’s (2010) terms. Being nonentities, anyway, they do not figure within the overall
ontological array of the world. As a result, pace Quine (1953), true existential quantifica-
tions over such objects is not a mark of ontological commitment; nor is such a commitment
entailed by true simple sentences about them.1 In order to explain how all such sentences
concerning nonexistent intentionalia may be true, Crane appeals to a form of psychologi-
cal reductionism. Such sentences are made true by facts in the world that do not involve
such objects; ultimately, psychological facts, such as one’s having mental representations
involving mental files about such objects.
Certainly, as Crane himself underlines,2 there are many similarities between Crane’s
own perspective and noneism, as developed both in Routley (1980) and in Priest (2016). To
begin with, for noneists nonexistent objects in general differ from entities, insofar as unlike
the former, the latter exist. One might think that for noneists, the domain of nonexistent
objects is broader than the domain of Crane’s nonexistent intentionalia. For one thing, this
thought is surely true, insofar as noneists include in that domain not only mathematical
items and possible but also as impossible worlds, on which Crane is mostly silent.3 However,
as noneists acknowledge,4 just as for Crane the epistemic source of nonexistence in general is
intentionality. For nonexistent objects are originally conceived in intentional states that are
directed upon them. Moreover, also for noneists nonexistent intentionalia do not constitute
a sui generis metaphysical kind. Leaving aside the particular case of mathematical items,
metaphysically speaking both a nonexistent object and an existent entity are concreta;
their difference as to existence makes no metaphysically relevant difference between them,
nor is any metaphysical difference produced by their respective being thought.5 Finally,
noneists manifestly share Crane’s polemical attitude against Quine’s criterion of ontological
commitment. As both Routley and Priest explicitly underline, to be is not to be the value of
a bound variable, but to exist, a first-order property that only entities possess; nonexistent
objects do not have any form of existence whatsoever.6 Thus, just as for Crane sentences
like:
(1) There are / some intentional objects (that) do not exist
(2) Some characters in the Bible (e.g. Abraham and Moses) do not exist
1Ideas similar to those of Crane have been defended, merely with respect to nonexistent objects of
hallucination, originally by Smith (2002). They also occur in Sainsbury (2010, 2017), Sainsbury-Tye (2012).
2Cf. Crane (2013:26-7).
3As Priest himself (20162:274-6) remarks.
4Cf. e.g. Routley (1980:34 and fn.1,423), Priest (2016:210).
5Cf. Priest (2016:136-7,200-1).
6Cf. Routley (1980:411-2,414,424), Priest (2016:14,108-10).
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are true even if they do not commit us to fictional or anyway nonexistent intentional
objects,7 for noneists quantified sentences introduced by the unloaded particular quanti-
fier “some(thing)” do not (at least existentially) commit us to anything, unlike sentences
introduced by the loaded particular quantifier, the existential quantifier “There is/exists”.8
To be sure, there seems to be a basic difference between noneists and Crane. Noneists
unreservedly accept Meinong’s (1960) Principle of the Independence of being-so, having
properties, from existence.9 For Routley, this allows nonexistent objects to have a variety
of properties, typically the properties characterizing those objects themselves (constituting
their specific nature, as some would say).10 Yet since for Crane the majority of properties
are existence-entailing, for him the principle holds just in a limited series of cases, typically
wrt categorical properties that yield the general metaphysical nature of the nonexistent
objects at stake. So for instance, for Crane, unlike Routley, it is not the case that the
nonexistent Pegasus has the property of being a winged horse, for this is an existence-
entailing property. Yet for him Pegasus has the property of being a mythical object, insofar
as this property qualifies the general metaphysical nature it has utterly independently of the
fact that it does not exist.11 Yet while it is true that this different adhesion to the Principle
of Independence marks a difference between Crane’s perspective and Routley’s perspective
on nonexistents, it is more controversial whether Crane and Priest are really different on
this respect. This depends on the fact that Priest adheres in a different way from Routley
to Routley’s himself (actually, Meinong’s)12 Characterization Postulate, which Crane does
not endorse as such. According to this postulate, “objects, whether they exist or not,
actually have the properties which are used to characterize them, for example, where f is
a characterizing feature, the item which fs indeed fs.” (1980:46). In order to avoid well-
known puzzles, Routley endorses this postulate only as far as characterizing properties are
concerned. Thus, the golden mountain, which does not exist, has both the characterizing
properties of being golden and being mountaneous. Yet the existent golden mountain, which
does not exist as well, has the same characterizing properties as the golden mountain, yet
it simply fails to have the noncharacterizing property of existence. Therefore pace Russell
(1905a,b), it does not violate the law of noncontradiction by existing and failing to exist
at one and the same time.13 Yet Priest claims that the postulate holds unrestrictedly,
by i) dropping the distinction between characterizing and noncharacterizing properties,
ii) accepting the idea that many properties are existence-entailing, and yet iii) holding
that an object has the properties that characterize it in the worlds that are (partially)
described by its relevant representation. Since these worlds may well differ from the actual
7Cf. Crane (2011:5,17).
8Cf. Routley (1980:9-10,81,424), Priest (2016:13-4,198).
9Cf. Routley (1980:24-5), Priest (2016:82,319).
10Cf. Routley (1980:45-6).
11Cf. Crane (2013:27,59-63).
12Cf. Meinong (1960:82).
13Cf. Routley (1980:47,90-1).
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 2.5
127
one, the problem Russell raises vanishes. Just as the golden mountain, the existent golden
mountain, which actually fails to exist as well, has the existence-entailing properties of being
golden and being mountaneous in the worlds in which it also has the property of existence;
namely, the worlds that realize the way it is represented to be in its characterization.
Since in this case such worlds are evidently not the actual one, no contradiction arises.14
Now, this move entails that, although an actually nonexistent object does not actually
have the properties F,G,H... by means of which it is characterized if they are existence-
entailing properties, it still actually has the properties of being represented as F , as G,
as H ...15 For instance, albeit nonexistent, both the golden mountain and the existent
golden mountain actually have the property of being represented as a golden mountain.
Yet Crane admits that nonexistent intentionalia actually and basically have what following
McGinn (2002) he calls representation-dependent properties, i.e., properties that depend
for their true attribution on the existence of some representations; ultimately, intentional
states.16 Being represented as being a golden mountain is therefore a property that also for
Crane the golden mountain actually possesses, insofar as it is the nonexistent intentionale
of an intentional state in which it is so represented. Thus, the explicitly different attitudes
towards the Principle of Independence and the Characterization Postulate do not mark a
genuine difference between Crane and at least the Priestian version of noneism.
To my mind, the real point of difference is another. As I said before, Crane subscribes
to a form of psychological reductionism, according to which sentences about nonexistent
intentionalia are made true by facts in the world involving no such objects, ultimately
representational facts, for reality as a whole does not contain such objects: “the entire
world - reality, being, the universe, call it what you like - does not contain more than
what exists” (2013:3). Yet for noneists nonexistent objects, although they do not exist, are
part of reality: “the admission of nonesixtent objects is meinongianism, or, as I shall call
it [...] noneism” (Priest 2016:14). Thus, nonexistents contribute to constitute the overall
ontological domain. As Priest acknowledges, Crane’s psychological reductionism is a form
of noneist antirealism, to be distinguished from his own (and Routley’s) realist noneism.17
To be sure, Priest himself suggests that this may be seen just a terminological dispute.18
If by “reality” one means the same as “being”, as Crane explicitly says in the above
14Cf. Priest (2016:84-5).
15As Priest implicitly admits by ascribing nonexistents intentional properties, like being thought of. Cf.
(2016:216).
16Cf. Crane (2013:60).
17Cf. Priest (2016:275). To be sure, he uses “anti-realism” in a nonstandard way, namely to mean a form
of noneism with variable domains that admits nonexistent objects just in the worlds in which they figure by
depending on the mental activities of their creators (ib:264). This way of putting things is often considered
to be appealing wrt fictional objects (cf. Berto 2013). Yet ontologically speaking this is standardly taken
to be a form of realism (cf. e.g. Thomasson 1999); it may be taken as an antirealism just in a metaphysical
sense, insofar as the objects in question are mind-dependent ones. In this sense, Crane is not an antirealist,
for he does not allow for nonexistent intentionalia even as mind-dependent items.
18Cf. Priest (2016:273fn.22).
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quotation, then clearly enough nonexistents are not part of reality, since they have no form
of being whatsoever. Yet if by “reality” one means something that is beyond being and
nonbeing in the sense of Meinong (1960), “as applied to the domain of all objects” (Priest
2016:273fn.22), then clearly enough, nonexistents are part of reality.
Yet to my mind, the dispute is more than terminological. For Crane, intentionalia
are objects of thought in the very same way as, in direct object linguistic constructions,
grammatical objects are targets of transitive verbs.19 This means that by themselves,
intentionalia have no ontologically constitutive import whatsoever. Only if they exist,
i.e., only if they are entities, they have for Crane such an import; if not, they are simply
ways for us to identify certain thoughts as different entities. As he says,20 a thought of
Vulcan is different from a thought of Zeus insofar as they may be respectively identified
as a thought about a certain intentionale and as a thought about another intentionale –
just as, one may add, dancing a tango and dancing a waltz are different dancings insofar
as the first is a tango dance (namely, a way of dancing: dancing tangoely, as adverbialists
on intentionalia would say)21, while the second is a waltz dance (namely, another way of
dancing: dancing waltzly, as again adverbialists would say). This is something a noneist is
far from accepting, since for her nonexistent intentionalia have such a constitutive import.
As Routley says, a thought of a unicorn is different from a thought of a mermaid insofar
as they are about nonexistent objects that have a different specific nature.22
The issue can be clearly seen if we consider the case of an indeterminate intentional
object, what a nonspecific form of thought seemingly mobilizes. For Crane, just as a specific
(and singular)23 thought by Leverrier about Vulcan has the determinate object Vulcan as
its intentionale,24 a nonspecific thought such as Vladimir’s desire of a bottle of inexpensive
burgundy has the indeterminate object a bottle of inexpensive burgundy, i.e., some such
bottle or other, as its intentionale.25 Now if we move from Crane to Sainsbury and Tye,
who draw a distinction between things and objects viz. entities structurally analogous
to Crane’s distinction between (intentional) objects and entities, we have that from their
similar sentences reporting intentional objectual states respectively read specifically and
nonspecifically (the second one involving a famous example of Quine):
(3) Macbeth hallucinated a dagger
(4) I desire a sloop
19Cf. Crane (2001:15-7, 2013:91-2). This does not mean that for Crane intentionalia are grammatical
objects, but just, as I said in the text, that their relation to thoughts about them is structurally the same
as the relation of grammatical objects to the sentences that contain the relevant transitive verbs.
20Cf. Crane (2001:25-6).
21Cf. e.g. Kriegel (2011).
22Cf. Routley (1980:45).
23This specification is intended by Crane to account for the difference between specific yet singular
thoughts and specific yet plural thoughts, thoughts that are about pluralities. Cf. Crane (2013:141).
24Cf. Crane (2013:92).
25ib.; see also Crane (2001:16).
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one can legitimately infer, respectively:
(5) There is something Macbeth hallucinated (namely, a dagger)
(6) There is something I desire (namely, a sloop)
which are true even though they commit us to nothing whatsoever.26 So, for a psychological
reductionist there is no ontologically relevant difference between a determinate, though
nonexistent, intentionale and an indeterminate intentionale, insofar as both are just like
grammatical targets. Yet for noneists on the one hand, to infer (5) is legitimate insofar as
it quantifies over a nonexistent intentionale, while on the other hand, (6) seems far from
being legitimate, for the only legitimate inference a noneist mentions that one can draw
from (4) is:
(7) I desire that I have something / there is something (namely, a sloop) I have27
where the particular quantifier has an embedded position, so it quantifies over nothing
at all.28 Now, it is hard not to spell out such a difference in ontological terms. On
the one hand, for the noneist the determinate, though nonexistent, intentionale that (3)
mobilizes figures within the overall ontological domain. Yet on the other hand, for her
the indeterminate intentionale that (4) mobilizes does not figure within that domain. For
the noneist, therefore, there is an ontological difference between the two intentionalia that
the psychological reductionist cannot account for. The most natural way of accounting
for that difference is to say that one is ontologically committed to the first yet not to the
second intentionale, even though, since the first does not exist, one is not existentially
committed to it. Routley is (sometimes at least) tempted by adopting this way of putting
things, even though normally for him ontological commitment and existential commitment
collapse on one another. For instance, he once says that if “ontological commitment is
determined through preparedness to quantify, [then] noneism is ontologically committed to
what it maintains does not exist, e.g. possibilia, abstractions, and so on” (1980:414fn.1).
Now, although Priest explicitly says that ontology is just the doctrine of what has being
(viz., exists),29 it is quite coherent for the noneist to adopt a wider conception of ontology,
according to which noneism is the ontological doctrine both of what exists and of what
does not exist. Sometimes Meinong as well allowed for this way of putting things, by
accepting that “ontology” may be a different label for what he normally calls “Theory of
Objects”: “‘Ontology,’ ‘the theory of categories,’ and the other subjects assigned more or
26Cf. Sainsbury (2010:317), Sainsbury-Tye (2012:114). For other similar examples see Sainsbury (2017).
Curiously enough, Crane (2013:56) does not allow for an inference of that kind from (3) to (5). Yet probably
he has there in mind just a loaded reading of the particular quantifier.
27In this case, as Hale (2007:100fn.10) underlines, the embedded quantifier is preferably loaded. But in
other cases it may be unloaded as well.
28Cf. Priest (2016:65-7). To be sure, Sainsbury himself acknowledges that “there is a sloop such that I
desire it” is not inferable from (4). Cf. (2010:305,317).
29Cf. Priest (2016:250).
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less unanimously to metaphysics [the theory of existents] have occasionally allowed a place
for interests extending beyond the limits of the real [Wirklichen]” (1960:107).
2 Noneist allism
By focusing on the contrast between sentences like (5), admittedly true, and (6), which
seems to be false, the previous reflections have shown not only the perhaps obvious result
that room has been found for a noneist to be ontologically committed to existents as well
as to nonexistents, but also the definitely less obvious result that there is a chance for
such a commitment to be expressed a` la Quine, i.e., quantificationally. Now, once noneist
ontological commitment is captured by true existential quantification, one may reformulate
this commitment in the terms put forward by Lewis (1990). Following Lewis, one may
indeed say that noneism is a form of allism, namely a doctrine ontologically committed to
everything, once one holds that the noneist unloaded particular quantifier and the Quinean
quantifier, the existential quantifier, are just one and the same quantifier, i.e., an expression
endowed with exactly the same meaning, for one can translate one quantifier by means of
the other one – translation has to go both ways, as Priest himself underlines.30 Indeed,
according to this way of putting things, Routley “quantifies just as we do; over everything”
(Lewis 1990:29, my italics).
Notoriously, Priest rejects this interpretation, by favoring Lewis’ alternative interpreta-
tion of the matter, according to which Routley’s loaded particular quantifier is the same as
Quine’s existential quantifier.31 Yet it seems to me that Lewis’ original interpretation is,
if not correct, at least desirable. For it may convincingly account for how the ontological
disagreement between noneists and philosophers who not only stick to the Quinean exis-
tential quantifier but also dislike, a` la Quine, Meinongian ontological jungles - let me call
them the Quine-inspired philosophers - may be a genuine disagreement, not a disagreement
in the meaning of the relevant sentences. This would be impossible if the noneist unloaded
particular quantifier and the Quinean existential quantifier had different meanings, as per
the second interpretation. As Lewis himself remarks, “Disagreement remains. But Rout-
ley’s heresy becomes more intelligible from the standpoint of orthodoxy and, reciprocally,
orthodoxy becomes more intelligible from Routley’s standpoint” (ib.).32
If the disagreement is genuine and not a disagreement in the meaning of the quantifier
30Cf. Priest (2016:205).
31Cf. Lewis (1990:26), Priest (2016:199).
32In following Lewis’ interpretation of noneism, I am close to Woodward’s (2013) reading of the matter.
Yet it seems to me that Woodward goes too far by suggesting that the disagreement between a noneist and
a Quine-inspired philosopher is merely verbal, insofar as “there is a systematic and recursively specifiable
way to translate between the two theories which has the following result: that for every sentence which T1
says is true, there is a corresponding sentence which T2 says is true and for every sentence which T2 says
is true, there is a corresponding sentence which T1 says is true” (2013:190). As we will immediately see,
the disagreement is rather a relativistic disagreement, concerning the truth-value of the relevant sentences.
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expression, what does it amount to? To my mind, this disagreement concerns the scope
of the overall ontological domain, as differently fixed by differently taking the extension of
a certain first-order predicate standing for a substantive property of existence, i.e., as an
universal vs. a nonuniversal extension respectively, while identically taking the extension of
another first-order predicate standing for a formal property of existence, i.e., as a universal
extension.33 As Lewis himself had intuited; for him, so interpreted, Routley “affirms the
existence of all the controversial entities (as we may call them). He does not join us when we
dodge questions about some of these alleged entities by denying that they exist.” (1990:29).
Thus, sticking to the same quantifier as being endowed with the very same meaning makes
both Routley and his Quine-inspired adversary to be allists, in Lewis’ sense; namely, to be
people quantifying on everything, i.e., everything that formally exists. Yet it does not make
them the same kind of allists. For so interpreted, Routley accepts in the overall ontological
domain, i.e., the domain of what formally exists, what the Quine-inspired philosopher
instead rejects, i.e., some at least of the controversial entities (impossibilia above all).34
Put alternatively, the disagreement is a disagreement that affects the truth-value of the
relevant quantified sentences, as relativists on this matter would say.35
To see this point, to begin with, let me see how to interpret, first, the disagreement
between Meinong and some of the Quine-inspired philosophers, namely, those among the
Quine-inspired philosophers who accept at least some abstracta (just as the mature Quine
did),36 and second, let me introduce noneists into the picture. In actual fact, appearances
notwithstanding, both for Meinong and for those Quine-inspired philosophers there is a
first-order predicate of existence whose extension is universal - the predicate applies to all
items in the overall ontological domain - thereby standing for a certain first-order not only
universal but also formal property of existence, a property that makes no difference to the
items that have it. This property has been given different labels: being (Russell 1937),37
33A caveat. In what follows, I will talk of different first-order predicates of existence that respectively
stand for different first-order properties of existence. One may prefer saying that there is just one first-order
predicate of existence that is ambiguous, by meaning different such properties.
34In this respect, unlike the Routleyan allist, the Quine-inspired allist does not hold that “any object
that the the noneist embraces is a denizen of the allist’s ontology” (Woodward 2013:183). In order to
better grasp this point, the following story may be useful. Suppose that the existential quantifier ranged
over whatever is in a picture; whatever is in the picture constitutes the overall ontological domain. The
Routleyan allist and the Quine-inspired allist would agree on the meaning of that quantifier, but would
disagree on what is in the picture, or in other words, on the cardinality of the overall ontological domain.
The Routleyan allist would hold that there are many more things in the picture than the Quine-inspired
allist would acknowledge - say, invisible parts of objects.
35Cf. e.g. Recanati (2007). However, it is not a faultless disagreement, for both parties have their own
reasons as to why things have to be seen as they claim. Even Quine himself would be ready to accept this
way of putting things. For, as he says, the disagreement in question consists in the two parties different
sayings as to what there is (1953:15-6), thereby suggesting that such sayings differ in their truth-value.
36As it will immediately emerge soon below, I distinguish these Quine-inspired philosophers from those
who, like the young Quine, accept just concreta; namely, those kinds of things that are qualified by what I
will later call P-existence, i.e., existence as being endowed with causal powers.
37Pace the standard noneist interpretation (cf. e.g. Routley 1980:437, Priest 2016:106,251), Russell’s
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existence in a logical sense (Williamson 2002), being identical with something (Lewis 1990),
being an object (Berto 2013:68). As Lewis himself proceeds in the above quotation, Routley
“quantifies just as we do; over everything; that is (as we would say) over everything that
exists” (1990:29; my italics). Here “exists” means precisely this first-order, formal and
universal property.
Yet moreover, in actual fact those Quine-inspired philosophers take this predicate to be
coextensional with another first-order predicate of existence that stands for a different first-
order property, a substantive property of existence, a property that makes a difference to the
items that have it: an object having this form of existence must have entered the spacetime,
or must have been introduced via some sort of mathematical demonstration. Here is where
the disagreement with Meinong arises. For Meinong would deny that the first first-order
predicate and the second first-order predicate are coextensional, by conceiving the first-
order substantive property the second predicate stands for as being nonuniversal, insofar
as only some items within the overall ontological domain have it. This is what Meinong
called Sein and that we might rename in his honour M-existence. This is a property that
both some concreta, i.e., items possibly having spatiotemporal connotations (e.g., Everest
and Mont Blanc), and some abstracta, i.e., items necessarily having no spatiotemporal
connotations (e.g., the square and the circle), possess, while some other concreta (e.g., the
golden mountain) and some other abstracta (e.g, the round square) fail to possess it (where
Meinong further labels subsistence (Bestand) the property of M-existing while necessarily
having no spatiotemporal connotations that just abstract items may possess).
At this point, furthermore, noneists come on stage, by spreading Meinong’s disagree-
ment with other Quine-inspired philosophers, those who accept just concreta (as the young
Quine did). Noneists may be taken to claim that the first first-order predicate, the predi-
cate that stands for the formal and universal first-order property, is not even coextensional
with another first-order predicate that stands for an even more substantive and definitely
nonuniversal first-order property of existence, a property that makes a big difference to
the items that have it. To quote Routley himself: “existence often makes a substantial
difference to an object and to its character; e.g., removal of existence by death or destruc-
tion can make the difference between a lively energetic creature and a lifeless object that
was (even briefly), before, that creature” (1980:51). This is the property some people have
labeled existence in a physical sense (Williamson 2002) and that noneists tend to take, a` la
Plato, as being endowed with causal powers: P-existence, let us say, which may be further
seen as being the same as having spatiotemporal connotations.38 Now, noneists ascribe to
these other Quine-inspired philosophers the contrary coextensivity claim that for them is
erroneous, namely the claim that the first-order predicate that stands for the formal uni-
versal property of existence is coextensional with the first-order predicate that stands for
being is not the same as Meinong’s Sein, which includes both things existing spatiotemporally and things
existing nonspatiotemporally (subsisting). For one thing, chimeras have being for Russell, Nichtsein for
Meinong.
38Cf. Castan˜eda (1989), Priest (2016:xxvii-xxviii), Berto (2013:61-5).
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the more substantive property of existence, P-existence.39 See again Lewis: “If ‘existence’
is what he thinks it is a distinction among the items we are committed to-then we dispense
with existence.” (1990:30).40
As a result of this (admittedly complex) situation, the disagreement between such
parties - the different sorts of Quine-inspired philosophers on the one side, Meinong and the
noneists on the other side – manifests itself in the different evaluation of certain quantified
sentences where the quantifier actually keeps the same meaning. To be sure, noneists also
believe that the first-order predicate of existence that occurs in such sentences is not the
same as the predicate that both for the first group of Quine-inspired philosophers and
Meinong those sentences mobilize, since for them that predicate does not stand for Sein,
as both those Quine-inspired philosophers and Meinong instead hold, but for the more
substantive property of existence, P-existence. Thus for noneists, a small difference of
meaning in those sentences still arises as to the first-order predicate occurring there. Take
e.g.:
(8) There are no nonexistent objects.
(8) is (trivially) true for those Quine-inspired philosophers, yet false both for Meinong
and for noneists. For those Quine-inspired philosophers, (8) is true. For they take the
substantive property that the second first-order predicate of existence figuring in it stands
for, Sein, as universal and therefore coextensive with the first-order formal property of
existence the first first-order predicate of existence stands for, being an object, thereby fixing
the scope of the overall ontological domain over which the quantifier figuring in (8) ranges.41
39So interpreted, these Quine-inspired philosophers are different from the previous Quine-inspired philoso-
phers who actually endorse the previous coextensivity claim that for Meinong is erroneous as well; namely,
the claim that the first-order predicate that stands for the formal universal property of existence is coex-
tensional with the second first-order predicate of existence that stands for the merely substantive property
of existence, Sein. Thus, it is not thoroughly exact to say “where the noneist says that something is an
object, the Platonist [i.e., the fan of abstracta] says it exists, using the word less restrictively than the
noneist” (Hale 2007:109). For one should rather say that where the noneist says that something is an
object, the Platonist says the same, plus that it also exists, using (erroneously, for the noneist) the word
less restrictively than the noneist.
40One might suspect that this proliferation of substantive first-order properties amounts to postulating
ways of being that specify the formal first-order property of having being. In this vein, one may wonder
up to what extent the Quine-inspired philosophers I have appealed to here are really Quinean, since Quine
notoriously rejected ways of being (1960:242). To be sure, one might immediately reply that the above
properties are not ways of being, insofar as the latter amount to second-order properties expressed by re-
stricted existential quantifiers (cf. McDaniel 2009:302-3). Yet this reply is controversial, for one may wonder
whether first-order substantive properties come back from the rear door as what induces the restrictions.
To my mind, a better reply is that such properties are not exclusive, for one and the same thing (e.g., a
concretum) may both P-exist and have Sein, whereas ways of being are (tendentially at least) exclusive (cf.
again McDaniel, ib.:312). An even better reply is that such properties are not ways of being for, rather than
restricting the scope of the quantifier, they serve to determine the scope of the overall ontological domain
on which the unrestricted quantifier ranges.
41Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the second group of Quine-inspired philosophers, insofar as they
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Yet for Meinong (8) is false, for he takes that substantive property as nonuniversal, thereby
failing to fix the scope of the overall ontological domain over which the quantifier figuring
in (8) ranges. As a consequence, Meinong would take (8) as true only if its quantifier were
contextually restricted to existents in the sense of the substantive, for him nonuniversal,
first-order property of existence, Sein. For noneists, (8) is false as well, insofar as they
however hold that the sentence contains another first-order predicate that stands for a
more substantive and still nonuniversal property of existence, P-existence. In this, they part
company both with those Quine-inspired philosophers and with Meinong, for both those
Quine-inspired philosophers and Meinong take that the first-order predicate occurring in
(8) to stand for the substantive Meinongian property of existence, Sein, that the first take
as universal while the second takes as nonuniversal.42 As a consequence, noneists would
take (8) as true only if its quantifier were contextually restricted to existents in the sense
of the more substantive, for them nonuniversal as well, first-order property of existence,
P-existence. Conversely,
(9) There are objects that do not exist
is false, if not even contradictory, for those Quine-inspired philosophers. For they take
the substantive property that the second first-order predicate of existence figuring in it
stands for, Sein, as universal, thereby fixing the scope of the overall ontological domain
over which the quantifier figuring in (9) ranges.43 Yet for Meinong (9) is true, for he
takes that substantive property as nonuniversal, thereby failing to fix the scope of the
overall ontological domain over which the quantifier figuring in (9) ranges. For noneists,
(9) is true as well, insofar as they hold, unlike both those Quine-inspired philosophers
and Meinong, that the sentence contains another first-order predicate as standing for a
more substantive and still nonuniversal property of existence, P-existence. Moreover, what
allows both Meinong and the noneists to take (8) false and (9) true is the fact that they
take the scope of the overall ontological domain over which the quantifier figuring in (8)
and (9) ranges to be fixed just by the formal universal property of existence that, as I said
before, another first-order predicate of existence stands for: being an object. Indeed for
them,
(10) There are objects that are not objects
take the more substantive property that for them the first-order predicate of existence figuring in (8) stands
for, P-existence, as universal and therefore coextensive with the first-order formal property of existence
another first-order predicate of existence stands for, being an object.
42This is what allows a noneist to take modal sentences like “Holmes does not exist, but might have
done so” and “Routley existed, but might not have done so” to be true without any need for her to be
reformulated. Cf. Priest (2016:152-5,199-204).
43Mutatis mutandis, the same holds for the second group of Quine-inspired philosophers, insofar as they
take the more substantive property that for them the first-order predicate of existence figuring in (9) stands
for, P-existence, as universal.
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where that first-order predicate occurs, would be false, if not even contradictory. This is
a result of merely assuming the first-order formal universal property that the first-order
predicate occurring in (10) stands for, being an object, to fix the scope of the overall
ontological domain over which the quantifier figuring in (10) ranges.44 Incidentally, the
above Quine-inspired philosophers would agree on that evaluation, but as we have seen,
they would take (10) to be false, or even contradictory, because they take that formal
universal property of existence to be coextensive with the substantive first-order property
of existence, Sein.
I can immediately figure out what, also on behalf of Meinong himself, a standard noneist
would immediately protest. True enough, she may say, there may be a first-order predicate
that stands for a formal universal property, however suitably conceived: being an object, or
even being given (a possibility that Meinong himself suggested).45 But that property has
nothing to do with existence! For the only genuine property of existence is the property
that I have previously qualified as the more substantive one, which divides nonexistents
(mathematical items and possible worlds included) from existents: P-existence. This is
the property that is mirrored by the loaded particular quantifier, i.e., what is the same,
the standard noneist would go on saying, as the Quinean existential quantifier (what is
expressed by “there exists”, if not also by “there is”)46, for it is included in its definition that
also involves the unloaded particular quantifier (“there exists/is something, x, such that
A(x)” is “something, x, is such that it exists and A(x)”).47 This is moreover why existence
has, pace Quine, nothing to do with particular quantification, either loaded (existential
quantification) or even unloaded.
Yet it seems to me that this protest is not correct. First of all, as I have tried to show, all
such first-order properties are involved whenever there is an ontological disagreement: such
properties are respectively taken by the participants in that disagreement to be what fixes
the scope of the overall ontological domain.48 Hence moreover, that disagreement concerns
a disagreement as to the scope of ontological commitment, i.e., as to what one has to
put within that domain. In this respect, all such properties have to do with existence
in a very general sense. Finally, the quantification whose scope is so affected by such
44Cf. Priest’s response (2016:249-50) to a similar sentential case proposed by Kroon (2008): “Some
things, including Gandalf and the golden mountain, don’t exist in any sense whatever; in reality, they are
nothing”. Kroon (ib.:206) adds that the sentence may be fictionally true. This may well be the case, but
for me it is quite compatible with its being literally false.
45Cf. Meinong (1960:108). Yet later (1978) he seems to have admitted that this property has an existential
flavor. For the distinction between the formal universal property a certain first-order predicate stands for
and existence, cf. Priest, e.g. (2016:245fn.32) – even if he admits that for Quineans at least, what he calls
the vacuous predicate “to be identical with something” is a predicate of existence: ib.:14, xxviii,fn.16.)
46For Priest, “there is” and “there exists” mean actually the same thing (for a few exceptions, cf. his
discussion in 2016: chap.17). On this Routley is more uncertain, by allowing ”there is” to be somehow
ambiguous between the unloaded and the loaded quantifier - cf. e.g. (1980:28)
47Cf. Priest (2016:14).
48Another way of putting the disagreement is to say that what for the ‘desertic’ party simply fixes the
overall ontological domain, for the ‘overpopulating’ party simply restricts it.
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properties, i.e., existential quantification, which in this interpretation is the only such
quantification there is, has also to do with existence in this general sense. As Quine
wished along with a tradition stemmed out of Frege and Russell that however interpreted
existence merely as a second-order property, instantiatedness. For whenever it shows that
certain status properties49 are instantiated, true existential quantification shows what really
figures in such a domain. If e.g. (9) is true, it shows that the status property of being
a nonexistent object (the complement of Sein, the substantive property of existence) is
instantiated, thereby also showing that nonexistent objects figure in the overall ontological
domain.50 Just as different such sentences to the effect that there are fictional objects,
mathematical objects, concrete objects etc. would show, by also showing, if true, that the
corresponding categorical properties – being a fictional object, being a mathematical object,
being a concrete object, etc. – are instantiated.
As a final moral, therefore, one may say that a noneist reconstructed along the admit-
tedly nonstandard lines is committed to a plurality of different yet interconnected properties
of existence that all capture something that has to do with existence in general. These
properties are at least two, if not three, first-order properties of existence, a formal and
universal property, being an object, and a substantive nonuniversal property, Sein, or even
better for a noneists, a more substantive and still nonuniversal property, P-existence, as
well as a second-order property expressed by the existential quantifier.51 As a syncretist
towards existence would say, the contraposition between Quine-inspired philosophers as
defenders of existence as a second-order property and noneists as defenders of existence
just as a both (very) substantive and nonuniversal first-order property has no longer reason
to subsist.52
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50If we adopt Meinong’s stance on the matter; for noneists, (9)’s truth shows that the complement of the
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52For more on this see Voltolini (2012).
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